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Abstract—In resource allocation systems, inaccurate informa-
tion sharing situations are such that users can be aware, up
to a small error, about the other users’ demands and the
available global resource (which can be insufficient to meet the
overall demand). Consequently, given an allocation rule, users
can predict an allocation that will not necessarily coincide with
the actual one. In this work, we provide an estimation of the error
for a number of allocation rules and compare their robustness
in inaccurate information sharing settings.
I. BACKGROUND
Resource allocation protocols in communication networks
and computing systems are commonly used to ensure fairness
and efficiency when dividing resources among different agents
or users. A challenging situation is the choice of the allocation
rule when the amount of available resource is limited and not
sufficiently high to fully satisfy the entire demand.
Classically, the network setting is such that users have
little information about the available resources and demands
of other users. Nonetheless, with the emergence of new
networking features such as 5G infrastructure sharing and
programmability in SDN, and for auditability requirements
(i.e., to ensure tenants fair sharing), network setting is evolving
toward a complete information sharing situation so that all
users can be aware of the demands of the other users and of
the available resources for resource allocation systems [1], [2].
As an intermediate context between the classical no in-
formation sharing and the complete information sharing, we
consider the scenario in which the information is known
to have inaccuracy. In this work, we study the behavior of
resource allocation rules under this scenario that we call
inaccurate information sharing context, where the amount of
available resource is known up to a constant (Fig. 1); we
also highlight the impact of inaccurate information sharing
on the demand of the other users. Indeed, in certain practical
situations, such as in radio resource availability or in systems
over/under provisioned by the infrastructure provider, it is
likely to suffer from inaccurate information on the available
resources to be shared. Furthermore, complete sharing may
not be possible since this may require a lot of exchanges
of updates causing a large overhead. While the problem of
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Fig. 1: Information sharing contexts in resource allocation.
inaccurate information in networks has been studied before
[3], a formal treatment on the error estimate and fairness has
not been studied for different allocations schemes.
Formally, a resource allocation problem is characterized by
a pair (c, E), where c is the demand vector for users in N =
{1, ..., n}, with n > 1, and E is the resource to split among
them. Resource allocation is challenging when E is less than
the global demand of users (
∑n
i=1 ci ≥ E).
An allocation x ∈ RN is a n-dimensional vector where xi
represents the quantity of resource E assigned to each user
i ∈ N , and an allocation rule is a function that associates
a unique allocation x to each pair (c, E). In this work, we
consider three allocation rules discussed below.
Weighted proportional allocation rule: this is the result
of the maximization of
∑n
i=1 wi log xi subject to demand
boundedness (xi ≤ ci, ∀i ∈ N ) and efficiency constraints
(
∑n
i=1 xi = E) [4]. The weights wi can be chosen equal to 1
to get the proportional allocation rule or equal to ci to obtain
the allocation that assigns the same proportion of demand to
all users. We only consider the second case with wi = ci, that
is the allocation that maximizes the Jain’s index of fairness [5].
Max-Min Fair (MMF) allocation rule: This is an egalitarian
solution that privileges users with small demands [6]. After
ordering the users according to their increasing demand, i.e.,
c1 ≤ c2 ≤ · · · ≤ cn, the MMF allocation for user i is given
by: MMFi(c, E) = min
(
ci,
E−
∑i−1
j=1 MMFj(c,E)
n−i+1
)
.
Mood value: It revisits user satisfaction taking into account
the awareness of other users’ demands and the amount of
available resources [1], [2]. Each user i ∈ N is assigned
mini +m(maxi −mini) as its resource share, where mini
is what remains if all the other users in N \ {i} are fully
satisfied (mini = max{0, E −
∑
j∈N\{i} cj}), maxi is
the maximum user i can get, i.e., its own demand or the
available resource if the demand overcomes it, and m =
(E −
n∑
i=1
mini)/(
n∑
i=1
maxi −
n∑
i=1
mini) takes value in [0, 1].
II. ERROR ASSESSMENT
We are interested in evaluating the error on the allocation
when users are in a inaccurate information context (Fig. 1).
We treat first the case where there is error on the available
resource. For each user i ∈ N the error ERRi is defined as
|xˆi−xi|, where xi is the share obtained by i when the resource
is E and xˆi is the allocation for user i when resource is E±ε.
In the following, we calculate the value of the error,
considering the allocations described in the previous section.
Weighted proportional allocation: This allocation coincides
with the allocation that assigns the resource proportionally to
the demand, i.e., xpi = ciE/
n∑
i=1
ci when the resource is E.
If users believe that the available resource is E ± ε then the
allocation is xˆpi = ci(E ± ε)/
n∑
i=1
ci, which implies that the
error on the allocation for each user is:
ERRi = ±
ci∑n
i=1 ci
ε (1)
The error ε is divided between the users proportionally to
their demands.
MMF allocation: We consider the hypothesis that ε is small
enough not to change the nature of the user. This means that if
ci <
E
n
, it holds also that ci <
E−ε
n
. It follows that the users
with small demands receive the same amount of resource (i.e.,
their demand), while the excess ε is equally divided between
the users that receive less than their demand. When the first
k users receive their demands, the error is:
ERRi =
{
0, if i = 1, .., k
±ε
n−k , if i = k + 1, ..., n.
(2)
Mood value: For the mood value allocation, we need to
consider that we have four types of users when we take into
account the minimum and the maximum value they can get.
Table I shows that they are categorized checking (i) what
remains if the other users received what they demand and
(ii) the maximum quantity of resource they can get, i.e., ci if
they ask less than the available resource, E otherwise. In [1],
[2] it was shown that there exists just six types of scenarios
combining the different type of users. The six combinations
of users are:
• GM: All the players are in scenario GM.
• GG: All the players are in scenario GG.
• MM: All the players are in scenario MM.
• GM-GG: Some players of type GM, some of type GG.
• GM-MM: Some players of type GM, some of type MM.
• GM-MG: One player of type MG, the others of type GM.
We again consider the hypothesis that ε is small enough not to
change the nature of the user. This means that, e.g., if ci ≥ E
maxi = ci maxi = E
(ci < E) (ci ≥ E)
mini = 0 (
∑
j 6=i
cj > E) GM GG
mini 6= 0 (
∑
j 6=i
cj < E) MM MG
TABLE I: User types in complete/inaccurate information shar-
ing.
for a user i ∈ N it also holds ci ≥ E + ε, if
∑
j 6=i cj < E it
holds also
∑
j 6=i cj < E − ε, and so on.
1) Case GM: This case coincides with the weighted pro-
portional allocation. For each user i the error is given by (1).
2) Case GG: In this case, if the resource is E it holds
that mini = 0, maxi = E for each user i. The value of the
mood is m = E−0
nE−0 =
1
n
, and the mood value is xmi =
E
n
.
If the value of the available resource is E ± ε the value of
the mood mˆ is again equal to mˆ = 1
n
and the mood value is
xˆmi =
E±ε
n
. It follows that for each user i the error is equal
to: ERRi = ±ε/n (3).
In this case, the error is divided equally between the users
without considering the value of their demands.
3) Case MM: In this case, if the resource is E it holds
that mini 6= 0, maxi = ci for each user i. The value of the
mood is m =
E−n(E)+(n−1)
n∑
i=1
ci
n∑
i=1
ci−n(E)+(n−1)
n∑
i=1
ci
= n−1
n
, and the mood
value is xmi = E −
∑
j 6=i
cj +
n−1
n
(
n∑
i=1
ci − E). If the value
of the available resource is E ± ε, the value of the mood mˆ
is given by: mˆ =
E±ε−n(E±ε)+(n−1)
n∑
i=1
ci
n∑
i=1
ci−n(E±ε)+(n−1)
n∑
i=1
ci
= n−1
n
and the
mood value is xˆmi = E ± ε−
∑
j 6=i
cj +
n−1
n
(
n∑
i=1
ci−E ∓ ε). It
follows that for each user i the error is: ERRi = ±ε/n (4)
The error is equally divided between the users also here.
4) Case GM-GG: Let N = N1 ∪ N2 be partitioned into
two disjoint sets N1 and N2 representing the set of user of
type GM and GG, respectively. When the resource is E, the
value of the mood is m = E∑
i∈N1
ci+n2E
, and the mood value is
xmi =
E∑
i∈N1
ci+n2E
ci if i ∈ N1 and x
m
i =
E2∑
i∈N1
ci+n2E
if i ∈ N2.
If the value of the available resource is E ± ε, only the
maximum value for the user GG is changing. The value of the
mood is mˆ = E±ε∑
i∈N1
ci+n2E±n2ε
, and the mood value is xˆmi =
E±ε∑
i∈N1
ci+n2E±n2ε
ci if i ∈ N1 and xˆ
m
i =
(E±ε)2∑
i∈N1
ci+n2E±n2ε
if
i ∈ N2. Called D the denominator of m, the error is :
ERRi =


±
∑
i∈N1
ciεci
(
∑
i∈N1
ci+n2E)(
∑
i∈N1
ci+n2E±n2ε)
, i ∈ N1(
ε±2E
D±n2ε
∓ E
2n2
D(D±n2ε)
)
ε, i ∈ N2
(5)
5) Case GM-MM: Let N = N1 ∪ N2 be partitioned into
two disjoint sets N1 and N2 representing the set of user of
type GM and MM, respectively. When the resource is E, the
value of the mood is m =
(n2−1)(
∑
i∈N2
ci−E)+n2(
∑
i∈N1
ci)
n2(
∑
i∈N2
ci−E)+(n2+1)(
∑
i∈N1
ci)
, and
the mood value is xmi = mci if i ∈ N1 and x
m
i = E −∑
j 6=i
cj+m(
∑
i∈N
ci−E) if i ∈ N2. When the available resource
is E± ε the mood and the mood value are, respectively: mˆ =
(n2−1)(
∑
i∈N2
ci−E∓ε)+n2(
∑
i∈N1
ci)
n2(
∑
i∈N2
ci−E∓ε)+(n2+1)(
∑
i∈N1
ci)
, xˆmi = mˆci if i ∈ N1, xˆ
m
i =
2
E ± ε−
∑
j 6=i
cj + mˆ(
∑
i∈N
ci − E ∓ ε) if i ∈ N2. Called A the
denominator of m and B the one of mˆ, the error is:
ERRi =


±
∑
i∈N1
ciεci/(AB), i ∈ N1
±
( n∑
i=1
ci−E∓ε
B
+
(
n∑
i=1
ci−E)
∑
i∈N1
ci
AB
)
ε, i ∈ N2
(6)
6) Case GM-MG: Let N = N1∪N2 be partitioned into two
disjoint setsN1 and N2 representing the set of user of type GM
and the only one MG user, respectively. When the resource is
E, the value of the mood is m =
E−E+
∑
i∈N1
ci
∑
i∈N1
ci+E−E+
∑
i∈N1
ci
= 12 ,
and the mood value is xmi =
1
2ci if i ∈ N1 and x
m
i = E −∑
i∈N1
ci +
1
2 (E − E +
∑
i∈N1
ci) = E −
1
2 (
∑
i∈N1
ci) if i ∈ N2.
If the value of the available resource is E ± ε, due to the
hypothesis that we consider, only the minimum value for the
user MG is changing. The value of the mood mˆ is again equal
to 12 and the mood value is xˆi =
1
2ci if i ∈ N1 and xˆi =
E ± ε− 12 (
∑
i∈N1
ci) if i ∈ N2. It follows:
ERRi =
{
0, i ∈ N1
±ε, i ∈ N2.
(7)
Concerning the boundness of the error in case of the three
allocation policy we can state the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If the allocation rule is proportional, MMF or
mood value, the error to the users is less than or equal to ε.
Proof. The error boundness in case of proportional and MMF
allocation is easily proof from the error formulas (1), (2). The
mood value corresponds to the τ -value solution of bankruptcy
games as proved in [2] and satisfies the monotonicity property
as proved in [7]. We show that |xˆi−xi| ≤ ε. When the resource
is E + ε due to the monotonicity it holds:
xmi (E, c) ≤ x
m
i (E + ε, c), ∀i ∈ N (8)
and due to the efficiency it holds:
n∑
i=1
xmi (E, c) = E,
n∑
i=1
xmi (E + ε, c) = E + ε (9)
From (8) and (9) follows that xmi (E + ε, c) − x
m
i (E, c) ≤
ǫ, ∀i ∈ N . In similar way when the resource is E − ε due to
the monotonicity it holds:
xmi (E − ε, c) ≤ x
m
i (E, c), ∀i ∈ N (10)
and due to the efficiency it holds:
n∑
i=1
xmi (E, c) = E,
n∑
i=1
xmi (E − ε, c) = E − ε (11)
Given (10), (11) then xmi (E-ε, c)−x
m
i (E, c) ≤ ǫ, ∀i ∈ N .
III. ALLOCATED ERROR AND FAIRNESS CONSIDERATIONS
When each user has the same misknowledge of the available
resource (i.e., the same ε) equations (1)-(7) explain how the
error ε is distributed among them. In this section, we are
interested in the analysis of the fairness in the error sharing
for the allocation rules presented in section II.
As already noticed, the error, for each allocation, is bounded
by ε, i.e., the error is split between the users without anyone
being severely disadvantaged. Furthermore, considering the
fairness policy behind each error allocation, we can notice
that it is close to the one of the resource allocation. In fact:
• the weighted proportional allocation rule splits the error
proportionally to the users demands;
• the MMF allocation protects weak users, i.e., users with
a smaller demand compared to the other users, not
allocating them the error. No differences exist between
the other users, receiving the same proportion of the error;
• the mood value takes into account the nature of each user
and of the others.
In particular the mood value in the GM case allocates the error
as the proportional rule does; if the users are all of type GG,
or all of type MM, it does not make difference between the
user and that is a good property due to the fact that they have
close demands; in the case of mixed users, it assigns the error
considering the group to which a user belongs.
We now look at the variation of the user satisfaction between
the two scenarios with and without misknowledge on the avail-
able resource value using the three different allocation rules1.
The user satisfaction, when users can collect information about
other users’ demands and the available resource, has to be
measured as Si =
xi−mini
maxi−mini
wheremini andmaxi are equal
to are the smallest and the biggest possible allocation for the
user i [1], [2]. We can state the following:
Theorem 1. If each user has a full knowledge of the other
user demands and the same misknowledge on the available
resource (E ± ε instead of E), the mood value is the only
scheme that:
1) equalizes the satisfaction of the users,
2) equalizes the error on the user satisfaction.
Proof. The proof of the first part is in [1], [2]. Due to the fact
that the value of the satisfaction for all the user is the same for
both the case in which the resource is E and E ± ε, the error
on the satisfaction, i.e., the difference between the satisfaction
in case without and with the misknowledge on the available
resource, is the same.
Tables II and III show two counterexamples where propor-
tional allocation and MMF allocation do not allocate the same
satisfaction and the same error on the user satisfaction.
Figure 2 shows the variation of the satisfaction for the 6
possible cases. We can notice, as the theorem states, that the
value of the satisfaction is the same for each user and for
each value of E because it coincides with the mood m and
1In this analysis we consider the fairness concept linked to the users
satisfaction but other fairness properties can be analyzed, such as the envy-
freeness or other generalized measure of fairness, not strictly linked to the
concept of satisfaction [8] can be used.
xi S xˆi Sˆ ∆S (Sˆ − S)
User 1 1.3333 0.66665 1.3335 0.66675 10−4
User 2 4 0.6 4.0004 0.6 0
User 3 4.6667 0.53334 4.6671 0.53333 −10−5
TABLE II: Error on user satisfaction with the proportional
allocation - xi and xˆi are the allocation when E = 10 and
E = 10+ ε, S and Sˆ are the satisfaction when the allocations
are xi and xˆi, ε = 10
−3, c = (2, 6, 7).
3
(a) GM, c = (5, 6, 9), E = 10 (b) GG, c = (12, 13), E = 10
(c) MM, c = (2, 3, 4), E = 8 (d) GM-GG, c = (6, 8, 12), E = 10
(e) GM-MM, c = (2, 6, 7) , E = 10 (f) GM-MG, c = (2, 6, 12), E = 10
Fig. 2: Users satisfaction with and without misknowledge on
the available resource - mood value case.
mˆ. Furthermore, in Figures 2a, 2e, 2d, we clearly see that
the gap between the satisfaction value when the resource is
E (i.e., m) and when the resource is Eˆ (i.e., mˆ) is the same
for each user. In addition to the two properties stated in the
theorem, we can see that in Figures 2b, 2c, 2f the value of the
satisfaction does not increase or decrease when we consider
the error on the available resource. In this case the satisfaction
of the users, called also mood, depends only by the number
of users and not by the value of the demands. That are in fact
situations (i) in which each single user has the same nature of
the coalition of the other ones, or (ii) in which there is only
one greedy user. As already explained, in the first case the
the error is split uniformly between the users and in second
one the greedy users keeps all the error. Another interesting
fact is that the slope of the satisfaction line for users with
smaller demands is not smaller than the one of users with
bigger demands. This imply that for these users the allocated
error cannot be bigger than the other ones.
xMMFi S xˆ
MMF
i Sˆ ∆S (Sˆ − S)
User 1 2 1 2 1 0
User 2 4 0.6 4.0005 0.60002 2 · 10−5
User 3 4 0.4 4.0005 0.39998 −2 · 10−5
TABLE III: Error on user satisfaction with the MMF allocation
- xi and xˆi are the allocation when E = 10 and E = 10 + ε,
S and Sˆ are the satisfaction when the allocations are xi and
xˆi, ε = 10
−3, c = (2, 6, 7).
Fig. 3: J∆S for three congestion levels as a function of E.
We now look at a global measure of fairness called Jain
index [5]. The fairness is maximized using the mood value
allocation, when we define the index as follows [1], [2]:
JS =
[ n∑
i=1
(
Si
)]2/
n
n∑
i=1
(
Si
)2
(12)
where Si =
xi−mini
maxi−mini
. We are then interested into evaluate
the global fairness on the error. In particular we can re-define
Jain index as follows:
J∆S =
[ n∑
i=1
(
∆Si
)]2/
n
n∑
i=1
(
∆Si
)2
(13)
where ∆Si is the difference of the satisfaction calculated
when the resource is E and when the resource is E ± ε. The
redefinition of the index is necessary to evaluate the fairness
on the satisfaction error. We can derive the following theorem.
Theorem 2. JS and J∆S are maximized when the resource
allocation is based on the mood value.
Proof. The maximization of JS happens when each user
receives the same satisfaction Si, and the maximization of J∆S
happens when each user receives the same ∆Si [1], [2]. From
Theorem 1, it follows that the mood value is the allocation
that maximizes the two indices of fairness.
We now test the behavior of the three considered allocation
schemes in term of J∆S by simulating 100 resource allocation
problems with random demands belonging to [1,10] while
varying the value of E. We set the error equal to 10−2. Fig. 3
shows the boxplot of J∆S when E is the 20%, 50% and 80%
of the sum of users demands. We note that the mood value
maximizes the fairness on the satisfaction error. In fact, the
index takes value in [0, 1], and the higher is its value, the higher
is the fairness. The proportional and the MMF allocation can
produce inequality between users, presenting median values
different from one and high variability.
In summary, when users are in the analyzed inaccurate
information scenario, they prefer the mood value allocation
because:
• it equalizes the user satisfaction and the satisfaction
error and it maximizes the Jain index of fairness on the
allocation and on the error;
• it takes into account the user nature in error splitting;
• in some cases, it allocates a portion of resource that
provides exactly the expected satisfaction.
IV. OTHER CASES OF INACCURATE INFORMATION
SHARING
Additionally, we consider (i) the case in which each user
has misknowledge on the available resource but the error is
4
weighted proportional ∓
(n−1)ciδE
(
∑
n
i=1 ci±(n−1)δ)(
∑
n
i=1 ci)
MMF
{
0, i = 1, .., k
∓kδ
n−k
, i = k + 1, ..., n
M
o
o
d
v
al
u
e GM ∓
(n−1)ciδE
(
∑
n
i=1 ci±(n−1)δ)(
∑
n
i=1 ci)
GG 0
MM ∓n−1
n
δ
TABLE IV: Evaluation errors for errors on users demands.
not equal among the users and (ii) the case in which users has
misknowledge of the other users’ demands.
When we have misknowledge on the available resources,
interestingly (1)-(7) still provide the evaluation of the error
for an user i, but clearly it depends on εi. We can notice that,
for each allocation and for each group of user, again the error
depends linearly on the value of the error, but compared to
the case analyzed in Section II, in which the error ε is shared
between the users so that the sum of the users error is equal
to ε, here it does not happen. The coefficient of dependency
varies between the users, taking into account the nature of the
user, i.e., the absolute value of the demand and the demand
compared to the other users. Because of the error of each
user depends on different variables, we can not compare in
general the allocations errors but from (1)-(7) we can see that
the error is always limited by εi, so that each of the allocation
considered does not strongly advantages/disadvantages an user.
In contrast, for scenario (ii) the error is not always limited
by ε and most of the time increases with the number of users.
Table IV shows the value of the error in case (ii) when the error
for each user is the same and equal to δ (for the mood value
we do not report mixed scenarios GM-GG, GM-MM, GM-
MG). For example, in the MMF case, the error can be greater
than δ but bounded by kδ. Furthermore, we can notice one
more time that the mood value assigns an error that depends
on the nature of the problem: it assigns the same error to users
belonging to cases GG and MM, while it differentiates users
belonging the group GM.
Looking at the satisfaction S, we can state the following
theorem.
Theorem 3. If each user has a full knowledge of the available
resource and the same misknowledge on the other users
demand, the mood value is the only scheme that equalizes
the error on the satisfaction for the same type of user.
Proof. We calculate the value of the ∆S in each case for each
type of user. We report the evaluation in Table V, where we
can see that for users of same type the error on the satisfaction,
i.e., ∆S (Sˆ − S) is the same.
From Table V we can also see that in some resource
allocation problem types (e.g. GG, MM,GM-MG), as it was
happening in case of misknowledge on the available resource,
the users receive an allocation that satisfies them at the same
level of the case of complete information.
V. CONCLUSION AND OPEN QUESTIONS
In this work, we analyze resource allocation with inaccurate
information sharing. We present three theorems that show that
User type S Sˆ
GM E∑n
i=1 ci
E∑
n
i=1 ci±(n−1)δ
GG 1/n 1/n
MM (n− 1)/n (n− 1)/n
GM E∑
i∈N1
ci+n2E
E∑
i∈N1
ci+n2E±(n1−1)δ
GG E∑
i∈N1
ci+n2E
E∑
i∈N1
ci+n2E±n1δ
GM
(n2−1)a+n2b
n2a+(n2+1)b
(n2−1)(a±n2δ)+n2(b±(n1−1)δ)
n2(a±n2δ)+(n2+1)(b±(n1−1)δ)
MM
(n2−1)a+n2b
n2a+(n2+1)b
(n2−1)(a±(n2−1)δ)+n2(b±n1δ)
n2(a±(n2−1)δ)+(n2+1)(b±n1δ)
GM 1/2 1/2
MG 1/2 1/2
TABLE V: Evaluation of Sˆ and S in case of full knowledge
of the available resource and the same misknowledge on the
other users demand. N1=set of users GM, N2=set of users of
the other type.
∑
i∈N2
ci − E = a,
∑
i∈N1
ci = b.
the mood value allocation is superior to the proportional and
MMF allocation in terms of fairness.
A number of questions and research paths remain open
for further work. Consider the analysis of the scenario in
which the error is on both the resource and users’ demand
and the multi-resource scenario, i.e., when the resources to
share are more than one and there exists a dependency between
resources. In this case allocation rules, as the DRF [9], are ob-
tained as results of an optimization problem [10]. Differently
from the case single-resource in which there are rules with a
direct formula to calculate the allocation, the estimation of the
error becomes complex and will be studied separately.
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